Human Rights Watch Urges Vietnam to Reject Penal Code Revisions Threatening Fundamental Freedoms and Police Accountability

The Vietnamese government is facing intense international scrutiny as Human Rights Watch (HRW) calls on the National Assembly to reject a series of proposed amendments to the country’s penal code. The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) recently submitted a draft of the revised code to the legislative body, sparking concerns that the new measures will further entrench a climate of repression, silence peaceful dissent, and grant the nation’s security forces unprecedented levels of legal immunity. The proposed changes, which include harsher penalties for vague political offenses and the elimination of independent oversight for police conduct, are viewed by advocates as a significant retreat from international human rights standards.

According to the legislative schedule, the Vietnamese National Assembly is currently reviewing the draft code during a session spanning from August 3 to August 24, 2026. The government anticipates a formal adoption of the revised penal code by October 20, 2026. If passed in its current form, the law would expand the definition of criminal activity to include a wider array of peaceful expressions and symbolic acts, while simultaneously dismantling the few remaining mechanisms used to hold law enforcement accountable for misconduct.

Strengthening the Legal Architecture of Repression

Central to the proposed revisions is the intensification of penalties associated with Article 331 and Article 117 of the existing penal code—two provisions that human rights organizations have long criticized as being the primary tools used to imprison bloggers, journalists, and activists. Article 331, which criminalizes "abusing democratic freedoms to infringe upon the interests of the State," is slated for a significant update. The Ministry of Public Security has proposed increasing the minimum prison sentence for violators of Clause 2 of this article from two years to three years.

Furthermore, Article 117, which prohibits "making, storing, disseminating or propagandizing information, materials and products that aim to oppose the State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam," is being broadened. The new draft seeks to explicitly prohibit acts that "aim to oppose the Communist Party of Vietnam." While the Party and the State are often functionally synonymous in Vietnam’s one-party system, the explicit inclusion of the Party in the criminal code provides a more direct legal basis for prosecuting any criticism of political leadership or organizational policy.

In a move that targets symbolic dissent, the ministry also proposes to criminalize "offenses against the Communist Party flag," a crime that would carry a maximum sentence of three years in prison. This addition aligns with a broader trend in the region where national symbols are increasingly used as a litmus test for political loyalty, with "disrespect" being equated to criminal sedition.

"The Vietnamese National Assembly should reject the Ministry of Public Security’s draft revised criminal code and all rights-violating articles that the authorities frequently use to silence critics," said Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. She emphasized that true freedom of expression necessitates the ability of citizens to voice opinions critical of their government without the looming threat of state retribution.

Shifting Toward a Punitive Fiscal Model

Beyond the increase in prison terms, the draft code introduces a fundamental shift in how the state handles minor infractions. Under the current penal code, judicial authorities have the discretion to issue "initial warnings" for individuals who have committed less serious crimes with mitigating circumstances. This serves as a non-carceral, non-monetary corrective measure for first-time or minor offenders.

The proposed revisions seek to eliminate this lighter form of punishment entirely. In the draft code, the minimum penalty for any infraction, no matter how minor or how many mitigating factors are present, would be a monetary fine. Critics argue that this change not only removes judicial flexibility but also places an undue financial burden on the country’s most vulnerable populations, effectively criminalizing poverty and ensuring that every interaction with the legal system results in a punitive record.

Institutional Impunity and the Removal of Oversight

Perhaps the most alarming aspect of the proposed legislative package involves the restructuring of police accountability. Parallel to the penal code revisions, the National Assembly is reviewing a draft of the revised Law on Organization of Criminal Investigation Bodies. Within this document, the Ministry of Public Security has proposed the total abolition of all "investigating bodies of the Supreme People’s Procuracy."

In the current Vietnamese legal framework, the Supreme People’s Procuracy acts as a vital, if limited, check on the power of the police. It is the only entity outside of the direct police hierarchy authorized to investigate allegations of torture, coerced confessions, or other illegal acts committed by police officers and security forces during criminal investigations.

If this proposal is adopted, the police force would effectively be tasked with investigating itself. This removal of external oversight creates a vacuum of accountability that Human Rights Watch warns will facilitate greater abuse of power. The ministry has further proposed exempting the police, armed forces, and paramilitary self-defense forces from criminal liability for acts committed while carrying out "official duties," a vague term that could be interpreted to shield officers from prosecution for excessive use of force or extrajudicial actions.

Timeline of the Legislative Process

The trajectory of these revisions follows a strict parliamentary timeline, suggesting a high degree of coordination between the security apparatus and the executive branch:

• August 3, 2026: The National Assembly begins its formal review of the draft revised penal code and the Law on Organization of Criminal Investigation Bodies.
• August 24, 2026: Conclusion of the initial review and debate session.
• September 2026: Period of internal committee review where adjustments may be made based on delegate feedback, though major concessions on security provisions are rare.
• October 20, 2026: Scheduled date for the final vote and adoption of the revised codes.
• January 1, 2027 (Projected): Expected date for the new laws to come into full effect across the country.

Human Rights Data and Regional Context

Vietnam’s move to tighten its penal code occurs against a backdrop of a sustained crackdown on civil society. Data from various monitoring groups, including The 88 Project and Human Rights Watch, indicates that Vietnam currently holds more than 160 political prisoners. In 2023 and 2024 alone, dozens of activists were sentenced to lengthy prison terms under the very articles (117 and 331) that the government now seeks to strengthen.

The proposed reduction of the death penalty is one of the few areas where the government appears to be making a concession to international pressure. The draft code proposes reducing the number of crimes punishable by death from 10 to 4: treason, murder, drug manufacturing, and terrorism. However, Human Rights Watch notes that Vietnam remains one of the world’s most frequent users of capital punishment, although official statistics on executions are classified as state secrets. HRW has urged the government to use this legislative window to abolish the death penalty entirely, rather than merely narrowing its scope.

Analysis of Broader Implications

The implications of these legal changes extend beyond the borders of Vietnam. As the country seeks to position itself as a key player in global supply chains and a strategic partner for Western nations, its domestic human rights record is becoming an increasingly important factor in international relations.

Vietnam is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which guarantees the right to freedom of expression and protection from arbitrary arrest. Legal experts suggest that the proposed amendments to Articles 117 and 331 are in direct violation of Vietnam’s treaty obligations. Furthermore, the European Union-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA) contains "human rights clauses" that allow for the suspension of trade preferences if a party is found to be in serious breach of fundamental rights.

The removal of police oversight and the expansion of "anti-state" definitions may also deter foreign investment in the long term. A legal environment where the state can arbitrarily seize assets or arrest individuals under vague security laws creates significant "country risk" for international corporations.

"Vietnam’s criminal laws need to be revised to become more protective of people’s rights, not to facilitate greater abuse by the police," Elaine Pearson stated. Her call for international donors and trade partners to press the Vietnamese government highlights the role of external diplomacy in shaping domestic policy.

As the National Assembly continues its session, the international community is watching closely. The final version of the penal code will serve as a definitive indicator of whether Vietnam intends to move toward a more transparent, rights-respecting legal system or if it will continue to prioritize absolute state and party control at the expense of its citizens’ fundamental freedoms.